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Various semantics have been used for conditionals in the area of knowledge representation
and reasoning. In this paper, we study similarities and differences between a purely qual-
itative semantics based on the popular system-of-spheres semantics of Lewis, an ordinal
semantics making use of rankings, a possibilistic semantics, and a semantics representing
conditionals by probabilities in a qualitative way. As a common framework for the corre-
sponding logics, we use Goguen and Burstall’s notion of institutions whose central motto
is that truth is invariant under the change of notation. The institution framework provides
the formal rigidity needed for our investigation, but leaves enough abstract freedom to for-
malize and compare quite different logics. We show precisely in which sense the condi-
tional semantics mentioned above are logically similar, and point out the semantical
subtleties each semantics allows.
 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As a part of the subjective belief state of an agent, conditional statements if A then B, formally denoted by ðBjAÞ, usually
have interpretations that are quite different from that of material implications A) B. Conditionals are more commonly used
to express intensional and meaningful relationships between antecedent, A, and consequent, B, making extensional truth val-
uations via A) B  :A _ B useless. This is quite obvious in the case of counterfactual conditionals [13] the antecedent of
which is known to be false, so their logical truth value (when interpreted as a material implication) would be true. However,
whereas the counterfactual If Christmas were in July, we wouldn’t have snow on Christmas would be considered an acceptable
statement in the temperate zones of the northern hemisphere, the counterfactuals If Christmas were in July, the law of gravity
would no longer hold, or even worse, If Christmas were in July, then Christmas were in November would be hardly accepted by
any reasonable person.
So, conditionals need a richer semantical environment than classical bivalued logics to be interpreted adequately. Besides
counterfactuals, there are other types of conditionals with peculiarities; a good logical overview can be found in [14]. In the
area of knowledge representation, conditionals have a broad range of application: they can be considered as formal repre-
sentations of default rules [8], or, on a meta level, as encodings of inference rules for nonmonotonic reasoning or of revision
strategies for belief revision [11].. All rights reserved.
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semantics based on the popular system-of-spheres semantics of Lewis [13], an ordinal semantics making use of rankings [19],
a (positive) possibilistic semantics [5], and a semantics representing conditionals by probabilities in a qualitative way
[17,18]. In particular, we will be interested in elaborating abstract logical relationships between these semantics. To this
aim, we will use the institutions which Goguen and Burstall introduced as a general formal framework for logical systems
[7]. An institution formalizes the informal notion of a logical system, including syntax, semantics, and the relation of satis-
faction between them. The latter poses the major requirement for an institution: that the satisfaction relation is consistent
under the change of notation.
Since the conditional logics under investigation here all use some kind of relation in a qualitative way to evaluate the
acceptance of conditionals, they are obviously similar. Moreover, they all have been used in the area of nonmonotonic rea-
soning to provide semantics for the axiomatics of so-called system P [12]. Nevertheless, the epistemiological and methodo-
logical backgrounds of possibilistic, ordinal, and probabilistic degrees of belief, respectively, are different, and we are going to
work out these differences clearly in this paper. The relationships among the different semantical frameworks representing
probability, possibility, and plausibility have already been studied by many authors (cf., in particular, [5,15,9]). Usually, those
works are concerned with transformations on the level of the nonmonotonic inference relation that can be established be-
tween a knowledge base and defeasibly derived formulas. The focus of this paper is a bit different, as we investigate formal-
ization and possible relationships on the level of basic semantic entailment between models and sentences. Performing our
studies in the framework of institutions allows us to base our ﬁndings on stringent logical properties that tie the semantics
closely to a (common conditional) syntax. An interesting aspect that will prove relevant to establish expected relationships
between different conditional logics is whether the worst degree of belief which may be assigned to a formula is reserved
exclusively for contradictions or not.
This paper continues work on comparing logics for knowledge representation and reasoning with very different syn-
tax and semantics, including propositional and probabilistic logics (cf. [2,3]). It is a revised and extended version of [4];
a preliminary version of the results on viewing the logic of big-stepped probabilities as an institution was given in
[3].
The organization of the paper is as follows: in the next section, we will brieﬂy recall the necessary formal details for insti-
tutions and institutions morphisms as a way of precisely relating and comparing logics. In Section 3, we continue by spec-
ifying purely qualitative, ordinal, possibilistic and qualitative probabilistic logics for conditionals as institutions. Based on
this framework, we study the formal similarities and differences between these logics by relating them via institution mor-
phisms in Section 4. Section 5 contains some conclusions and points to further work.2. Institutions
In this section, we will describe brieﬂy the framework of institutions we will be working with. As institutions are formal-
ized by using category theory, we will also very brieﬂy recall some basic notions of category theory; for more information
about categories, see e.g. [10]. To give an example, we present the institution of propositional logic the components of which
will be used throughout the paper. Moreover, we explain how institutions can be related to each other by institution
morphisms.
2.1. Basic deﬁnitions and notations
If C is a category, jCj denotes the objects of C and =C= its morphisms; for both objects c 2 jCj and morphisms u 2 =C=, we
also write just c 2 C and u 2 C, respectively. Cop is the opposite category of C, with the direction of all morphisms reversed.
The composition of two functors F : C ! C0 and G : C0 ! C00 is denoted by G  F (ﬁrst apply F, then G). For functors F;G : C ! C 0,
a natural transformation g from F to G, denoted by g : F ) G, assigns to each object c 2 jCj a morphism
gc : FðCÞ ! GðCÞ 2 =C0= such that for every morphism u : c ! d 2 =C= we have gd  FðuÞ ¼ GðuÞ  gc .SET and CAT denote
the categories of sets (with functions as morphisms) and of categories (with functors as morphisms), respectively.
The central deﬁnition of an institution [7] is the following:
Deﬁnition 1. An institution is a quadruple Inst ¼ hSig; Mod; Sen;  i with a category Sig of signatures as objects, a functor
Mod : Sig ! CATop yielding the category of R-models for each signature R, a functor Sen : Sig !SET yielding the
sentences over a signature, and a jSigj-indexed relation R # jModðRÞj  SenðRÞ such that for each signature morphism
u : R! R0 2 =Sig=, for each m0 2 jModðR0Þj, and for each f 2 SenðRÞ the following satisfaction condition holds:m0 R0 SenðuÞðf Þ iff ModðuÞðm0ÞR f
For sets F;G of R-sentences and a R-model m we write mR F iff mR f for all f 2 F. The satisfaction relation is lifted to
semantical entailment R between sentences by deﬁning FRG iff for all R-models m with mR F we have mRG.
F ¼ ff 2 SenðRÞjFR fg is called the closure of F, and F is closed if F ¼ F. The closure operator fulﬁls the closure lemma
uðFÞ#uðFÞ and various other nice properties like uðFÞ ¼ uðFÞ or ðF [ GÞ ¼ ðF [ GÞ. A consequence of the closure lem-
ma is that entailment is preserved under change of notation carried out by a signature morphism, i.e. FRG implies
uðFÞuðRÞuðGÞ (but not vice versa).
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As a basic example that will be useful throughout the paper, the components of the institution InstB ¼
hSigB; ModB; SenB; B i of classical propositional logic will be deﬁned in the following.
Signatures: SigB is the category of propositional signatures. A propositional signature R 2 jSigBj is a (ﬁnite) set of propo-
sitional variables, R ¼ fa1; a2; . . .g. A propositional signature morphism u : R! R0 2 =SigB= is an injective function mapping
propositional variables to propositional variables. Note that for InstB, injectivity of signature morphisms is not needed, but
for three of the conditional semantics studied in this paper, injectivity of u will ensure that the respective model functor
ModðuÞ is well-deﬁned.
Models: For each signature R 2 SigB, ModBðRÞ contains the set of all propositional interpretations for R, i.e.
jModBðRÞj ¼ fIjI : R! Boolgwhere Bool ¼ ftrue; falseg. Due to its simple structure, the only morphisms inModBðRÞ are the identity morphisms. For each
signature morphism u : R! R0 2 SigB, we deﬁne the functor ModBðuÞ : ModBðR0Þ ! ModBðRÞ by ðModBðuÞðI0ÞÞðaiÞ :¼
I0ðuðaiÞÞ where I0 2 ModBðR0Þ and ai 2 R.
Sentences: For each signature R 2 SigB, the set SenBðRÞ contains the usual propositional formulas constructed from the
propositional variables in R and the logical connectives ^ (and), _ (or), and : (not). The symbols > and ? denote a tautology
(like a _ :a) and a contradiction (like a ^ :a), respectively.
For each signature morphism u : R! R0 2 SigB, the function SenBðuÞ : SenBðRÞ ! SenBðR0Þ is deﬁned by straightforward
inductive extension on the structure of the formulas; e.g., SenBðuÞðaiÞ ¼ uðaiÞ and SenBðuÞðA ^ BÞ ¼ SenBðuÞðAÞ ^ SenBðuÞðBÞ.
In the following, we will abbreviate SenBðuÞðAÞ by just writing uðAÞ.
In order to simplify notations, we will often replace conjunction by juxtaposition and indicate negation of a formula by
overlining it, i.e. AB ¼ A ^ B and A ¼ :A. An atomic formula is a formula consisting of just a propositional variable, a literal is a
positive or a negated atomic formula, an elementary conjunction is a conjunction of literals, and a complete conjunction is an
elementary conjunction containing each atomic formula either in positive or in negated form. XR denotes the set of all com-
plete conjunctions over a signature R; if R is clear from the context, we may drop the index R. Note that there is an obvious
bijection between jModBðRÞj and XR, associating with I 2 jModBðRÞj the complete conjunction xI 2 XR in which an atomic
formula ai 2 R occurs in positive form iff IðaiÞ ¼ true.
Satisfaction relation: For any R 2 jSigBj, the satisfaction relationB;R# jModBðRÞj  SenBðRÞis deﬁned as expected for propositional logic, e.g. IB;R ai iff IðaiÞ ¼ true and IB;RA ^ B iff IB;R A and IB;R B for ai 2 R and
A;B 2 SenBðRÞ.
Proposition 2. InstB ¼ hSigB; ModB; SenB; B i is an institution.
Proving this is straightforward since the satisfaction condition I0 B;R0 uðAÞ iff ModBðuÞðI0ÞB;RA holds by easy induction
on the structure of A.
Example 3. Let R ¼ fs;ug and R0 ¼ fa; b; cg be two propositional signatures with the atomic propositions s – being a scholar,
u – being single and a – being a student, b – being young, c – being unmarried. Let I0 be the R0-model with
I0ðaÞ ¼ true; I0ðbÞ ¼ true; I0ðcÞ ¼ false. Let u : R! R0 2 SigB be the signature morphism with uðsÞ ¼ a; uðuÞ ¼ c. The functor
ModBðuÞ takes I0 to the R-model I :¼ ModBðuÞðI0Þ, yielding IðsÞ ¼ I0ðaÞ ¼ true and IðuÞ ¼ I0ðcÞ ¼ false.
Note that a signature morphism u not being surjective makes the model functorModBðuÞ a forgetful functor: In Example
3, any information about b (being young) in I0 is forgotten in I since b is not in the codomain of u. On the other hand, in this
paper, we require signature morphisms in InstB to be injective. This avoids redundancies among the propositional variables
that might cause ambiguities when two different variables ﬁnally turn out to have the same meaning. (Any two variables
mapped to the same variable under u would always be interpreted identically in any model reached by ModBðuÞ.) A con-
sequence of u being injective is that a complete conjunction will not be mapped to ? under u, i.e. uðxÞX ? for all
x 2 XR. Furthermore, for two distinct complete conjunctions x1;x2 2 XR, the formulas uðx1Þ and uðx2Þ are exclusive,
i.e. uðx1Þuðx2Þ ?.
2.3. Institution morphisms
An institution morphism U expresses a relation between two institutions Inst und Inst0 such that the satisfaction condi-
tion of Instmay be computed by the satisfaction condition of Inst0 if we translate it according to U. The translation is done by
relating every Inst-signature R to an Inst0-signature R0, each R0-sentence to a R-sentence, and each R-model to a R0-model.
Deﬁnition 4. Let Inst; Inst0 be two institutions, Inst ¼ hSig; Mod; Sen;  i and Inst0 ¼ hSig0; Mod0; Sen0;  0 i. An institution
morphism U from Inst to Inst0 is a triple h/; a; b iwith a functor / : Sig ! Sig0, a natural transformation a : Sen0  /) Sen, and
a natural transformation b : Mod) Mod0  / such that for each R 2 jSigj, for each m 2 jModðRÞj, and for each f 0 2 Sen0ð/ðRÞÞ
the following satisfaction condition (for institution morphisms) holds:
Fig. 1. Relationships within an institution morphism h/; a; bi : hSig; Mod; Sen; i ! hSig0; Mod0; Sen0; 0i.
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Fig. 1 illustrates the relationships within an institution morphism. After introducing various institutions in the next sec-
tion, we will give several examples of institution morphisms.3. Qualitative semantics for conditionals
Various types of models have been proposed to interpret conditionals ðBjAÞ (with propositional formulas A;B) adequately
within a logical system (cf. e.g. [14]). Many of them are based on considering possible worlds which can be thought of as
being represented by classical logical interpretations jModBðRÞj, or complete conjunctions x 2 X, respectively. One of the
most prominent approaches is the system-of-spheres model of Lewis [13] which makes use of a notion of similarity between
possible worlds. This idea of comparing worlds and evaluating conditionals with respect to the ‘‘nearest” or ‘‘best” worlds
(which are somehow selected) is common to very many approaches in conditional logics. A basic implementation of this
can be achieved by plausibility preorders which we will describe in Section 3.1.
There are other, more ﬁne-grained semantics for conditionals which aim at making the vague notion of plausibility pre-
orders more precise by using numbers to compare different degrees of ‘‘plausibility” between the veriﬁcation and the falsi-
ﬁcation of a conditional. Here, two of the most popular approaches make use of ordinal rankings and of possibility theory,
respectively. We will sketch these semantics in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. A less well-known but interesting approach to qualita-
tive conditional reasoning is possible by making use of so-called big-stepped probabilities which we will discuss in Section
3.4.
To prepare the grounds for comparing these different conditional semantics, we will formalize all these conditional logics
as institutions. More precisely, we will deﬁne the institution InstK of purely qualitative conditionals, the institution InstO of
ordinal conditionals, the institution InstPþ of (positive) possibilistic conditionals, and the institution InstS of big-stepped
probabilities. The signatures of all these institutions will be the same, namely the signature SigB of propositional logic.
So, all these logics will use a common vocabulary, and, as we will see, also a common syntax. This allows us to focus on
semantical peculiarities with clearly deﬁned links to syntactical issues.
3.1. Purely qualitative semantics
From a purely qualitative point of view, proper models of conditionals are provided by total preorders R (i.e. R is a
total, reﬂexive and transitive relation) over classical propositional interpretations, or possible worlds, respectively.
Possible worlds are ordered according to their plausibility; by convention, the least worlds are the most plausible
worlds.
For a preorder R, we will use the inﬁx notation x1Rx2 instead of ðx1;x2Þ 2 R. As usual, we introduce the R-rela-
tion by saying that x1Rx2 iff x1Rx2 and not x2Rx1. Furthermore, x1	Rx2 means that both x1Rx2 and x2Rx1
hold.
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sidered equally plausible (x1	Rx2 for x1;x2 2 Xj), and whenever x1 2 Xi and x2 2 Xk with i < k, then x1Rx2. Let MinðRÞ
denote the set of R-minimal worlds in X, i.e.MinðRÞ ¼ X0 ¼ fx0 2 Xjx0Rx for allx 2 XgMoreover, a total preorder on X extends to a total preorder on propositional formulas A;B 2 SenBðRÞ viaARB iff there exists x1 2 X with x1B;RA such that
for all x2 2 X with x2B;R B; we have x1Rx2
ð2ÞSo, A is considered to be at least as plausible as B (with respect to R) iff there is a world satisfying A that is at least as plausible
as any world satisfying B. In particular, if BB;R A, then ARB for each R 2 ModKðRÞ, since xB;R B implies xB;RA. Again,
ARB means both ARB and not BRA. Note that AR ? for all AX ?, hence also xR ? for all possible worlds x.
Finally, a total preorder R represents or accepts a conditional ðBjAÞ iff ABRAB, i.e. iff the veriﬁcation of the conditional (AB)
is found more plausible than its falsiﬁcation (AB).
Having sketched the basic ideas of purely qualitative semantics, we will now describe the components of the correspond-
ing institution InstK ¼ hSigK; ModK; SenK; K i, recalling results from [2].
Signatures: SigK is identical to the category of propositional signatures, i.e. SigK ¼ SigB.
Models: In correspondence with Lewis’ system-of-spheres semantics, we will consider the models R 2 ModKðRÞ to be total
preorders on X, ordering the possible worlds according to their plausibility, or similarity with the actual world:jModKðRÞj ¼ fR j R is a total preorder on jModBðRÞjg
We only consider the identity morphisms in ModKðRÞ for this paper.
For each signature morphism u : R! R0, we deﬁne a functor ModKðuÞ : ModKðR0Þ ! ModKðRÞ by mapping a (total) pre-
order R0 over ModBðR0Þ to a (total) preorder ModKðuÞðR0Þ over ModBðRÞ in the following way:x1ModKðuÞðR0 Þx2 iff uðx1ÞR0uðx2Þ ð3ÞNote that on the left hand side of (3) the complete conjunctionsx1 andx2 are viewed as models inModBðRÞ, whereas on the
right hand side they are sentences in SenBðRÞ.
It is straightforward to check that ModKðuÞðR0Þ is a total preorder (the corresponding properties are all directly inherited
by R0), so indeed ModKðuÞðR0Þ 2 ModKðRÞ. The connection between R0 and ModKðuÞðR0Þ deﬁned by (3) can also be shown to
hold for propositional sentences instead of worlds:
Lemma 5. Let A;B 2 SenBðRÞ. Then AModKðuÞðR0 ÞB iff uðAÞR0uðBÞ.
Proof. First, let AModKðuÞðR0 ÞB, and letx02 be any world withx02B;RuðBÞ. In order to show thatuðAÞR0uðBÞ, we have to show
that there exists x01 with x01B;R0 uðAÞ such that x01R0x02. Let fxB1; . . . ;xBng ¼ fxjxB;R Bg. Then B is equivalent to the dis-
junction xB1 _ . . . _xBn. From x02B;RuðBÞ we therefore get x02B;RuðxB1 _ . . . _xBnÞ and thus x02B;RuðxB1Þ _ . . . _uðxBnÞ.
Hence, there is some x2 2 fxB1; . . . ;xBng with x2B;R B such that x02B;Ruðx2Þ. Since AModKðuÞðR0 ÞB, there is x1 such that
x1B;R A and x1ModKðuÞðR0 Þx2, i.e. uðx1ÞR0uðx2Þ. Since uðx1ÞR0uðx2Þ and x02B;Ruðx2Þ, there exists x01 with
x01B;R0uðx1Þ and x01R0x02. Since x1B;RA we get uðx1ÞB;R0 uðAÞ (e.g. by the closure lemma), and together with
x01B;R0uðx1Þ this gives us x01B;R0 uðAÞ, as required.
Conversely, let now uðAÞR0uðBÞ, and let x2B;R B. In order to show AModKðuÞðR0ÞB, we have to show that there exists x1
with x1B;RA such that x1ModKðuÞðR0 Þx2. From x2B;R B we get uðx2ÞB;R0uðBÞ. Let x02 be minimal with respect to R0 in
fx0jx0 B;R0uðx2Þg; thus x02R0uðx2Þ. From x02B;R0 uðx2Þ and uðx2ÞB;R0uðBÞ we get x02B;R0uðBÞ. Since uðAÞR0uðBÞ,
there exists x01 with x
0
1B;R0uðAÞ such that x01R0x02. Let x1B;R A such that x01B;R0uðx1Þ. Then
uðx1ÞR0x01R0x02R0uðx2Þ, which implies x1ModKðuÞðR0Þx2, and therefore AModKðuÞðR0 ÞB. h
Sentences: For each signature R, the set SenKðRÞ contains (propositional) conditionals of the form ðBjAÞ where
A;B 2 SenBðRÞ are propositional formulas from InstB. For u : R! R0, the extension SenKðuÞ is deﬁned as usual by
SenKðuÞððBjAÞÞ ¼ ðuðBÞjuðAÞÞ.
Satisfaction relation: The satisfaction relation K;R # jModKðRÞj  SenKðRÞ is deﬁned, for any R 2 jSigKj, by
R K;R ðBjAÞ iff ABRABTherefore, a conditional ðBjAÞ is satisﬁed (or accepted) by the plausibility preorder R iff its conﬁrmation AB is more plausible
than its refutation AB.
Using Lemma 5, it is easy to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6. InstK ¼ hSigK; ModK; SenK; K i is an institution.
Proof. R0 K;R0 SenKðuÞððBjAÞÞ iff ModKðuÞðR0Þ K;R ðBjAÞ is the satisfaction condition we have to prove for each signature
morphism u : R! R0 2 SigC, for each R0 2 ModKðR0Þ, and for each ðBjAÞ 2 SenKðRÞ:
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iff uðAÞuðBÞR0uðAÞuðBÞ
iff uðABÞR0uðABÞ
iff ABModKðuÞðR0ÞAB
iff ModKðuÞðR0ÞK;R ðBjAÞ Example 7. We continue our student example in this qualitative conditional environment, so let R;R0;u be as deﬁned in
Example 3. Let R0 be the following total preorder on X0:R0 : abc R0 abc	R0abc R0 abc	R0abc	R0abc	R0abc	R0abc
For instance R0 K;R0 ðcjaÞ – students are supposed to be unmarried since under R0, ac is more plausible than ac. What does
ModKðuÞ, R0 look like? There are four worlds in XR ¼ fsu; su; su; s ug and their relationships under ModKðuÞðR0Þ are deter-
mined by the corresponding R0 relationships among uðXRÞ ¼ fuðsuÞ; uðsuÞ; uðsuÞ; uðs uÞg. According to (2), we haveuðs uÞ ¼ ac R0 ac ¼ uðsuÞ
uðsuÞ ¼ ac 	R0 ac ¼ uðsuÞ
uðsuÞ ¼ ac R0 ac ¼ uðsuÞTherefore, according to (3), underModKðuÞ, R0 is mapped onto R ¼ ModKðuÞðR0Þwhere R is the following total preorder onX:R : s u R su 	R su R suAs expected, the conditional ðujsÞ that corresponds to ðcjaÞ in SenKðR0Þ underu, is satisﬁed by R – here, scholars are supposed
to be single.3.2. Ordinal semantics
The basic idea of ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) [19] is to specify the partitioning sets deﬁned by total preorders in the
previous section by level numbers. OCFs are simply functions j : X! Nwith j
1ð0Þ–;. The smaller jðxÞ, the more plausible
is the world x. So ordinal rankings actually express a degree of disbelief or surprise to observe the corresponding world. For
propositional formulas A;B 2 SenBðRÞ, we havejðAÞ ¼minfjðxÞjx  Ag;
where min ; ¼ 1, considering ; as a subset of N, the range of OCFs. Therefore, jðA _ BÞ ¼minfjðAÞ;jðBÞg. If A ?, then
jðAÞ ¼ 1. Moreover, because none of the worlds is assigned an inﬁnite rank, jðAÞ ¼ 1 if and only if A ?.
Here, conditionals are given semantics by deﬁning that an OCF j accepts ðBjAÞ iff jðABÞ < jðABÞ, i.e. if it is a greater sur-
prise to observe AB than AB.
We are now going to formalize the components of the institution InstO of ordinal conditionals.
Signatures and sentences: As in the previous section, we choose propositional signatures: SigO ¼ SigB. For the sentences
functor, we make use of the constructions for purely qualitative conditionals which provide a formal language for condition-
als; hence SenO ¼ SenK.
Models: The models of this institution are ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) j : XR ! N as described above. Hence
jModOðRÞj ¼ fj : XR ! Njj is an OCFgFor each signature morphism u : R! R0, we deﬁne a functor ModOðuÞ : ModOðR0Þ ! ModOðRÞ by mapping an OCF j0 over
ModOðR0Þ to an OCF ModOðuÞðj0Þ over ModOðRÞ in the following way:ModOðuÞðj0ÞðxÞ ¼ j0ðuðxÞÞ ¼ min
x0uðxÞ
j0ðx0Þ ð4ÞNote that the injectivity of u ensures ModOðuÞðj0ÞðxÞ–1 for any world x; hence, ModOðuÞðj0Þ is a well-deﬁned OCF.
It is straightforward to generalize (4) to propositional formulas A 2 SenBðRÞ:ModOðuÞðj0ÞðAÞ ¼ j0ðuðAÞÞ ¼ min
x0uðAÞ
j0ðx0Þ ð5ÞSatisfaction relation: The satisfaction relation O;R # jModOðRÞj  SenOðRÞ is deﬁned, for any R 2 jSigOj, by
jO;R ðBjAÞ iff jðABÞ < jðABÞThus, a conditional ðBjAÞ is satisﬁed (or accepted) by the ordinal conditional function j iff its conﬁrmation AB is less surpriz-
ing than its refutation AB.
Using (5), we are now able to prove that these components make up an institution.
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Proof. We still have to check the satisfaction condition which holds due to the following derivation:j0 O;R0 SenOðuÞððBjAÞÞ iff j0 O;R0 ðuðBÞjuðAÞÞ
iff j0ðuðABÞÞ < j0ðuðABÞÞ
iff ModOðuÞðj0ÞðABÞ < ModOðuÞðj0ÞðABÞ
iff ModOðuÞðj0Þ O;R ðBjAÞ Example 9. An OCF j0 corresponding to the total preorder R0 in Example 7 would be the following:j0ðabcÞ ¼ 0
j0ðabcÞ ¼ j0ðabcÞ ¼ 1
j0ðabcÞ ¼ j0ðabcÞ ¼ j0ðabcÞ ¼ j0ðabcÞ ¼ j0ðabcÞ ¼ 2Note that j0 is not uniquely determined by R0, as for instance, j00ðabcÞ ¼ 0; j00ðabcÞ ¼ j00ðabcÞ ¼ 2;j00ðabcÞ ¼
j00ðabcÞ ¼ j00ðabcÞ ¼ j00ðabcÞ ¼ j00ðabcÞ ¼ 4 would be another OCF modelling of R0.
Considering the conditional ðcjaÞ – students are supposed to be unmarried – in this framework, we ﬁnd
j0ðacÞ ¼minfj0ðabcÞ;j0ðabcÞg ¼ 1 and j0ðacÞ ¼minfj0ðabcÞ;j0ðabcÞg ¼ 2; hence j0ðacÞ < j0ðacÞ, and therefore
j0 O;R0 ðcjaÞ. Under ModOðuÞ, j0 is mapped onto j :¼ ModOðuÞðj0Þ. According to (4), for x 2 fsu; su;su;sug, j is given as
follows:jðsuÞ ¼ j0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ j0ðacÞ ¼ min
x0ac
j0ðx0Þ ¼ 1
jðsuÞ ¼ j0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ j0ðacÞ ¼ min
x0ac
j0ðx0Þ ¼ 2
jðsuÞ ¼ j0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ j0ðacÞ ¼ min
x0ac
j0ðx0Þ ¼ 1
jðs uÞ ¼ j0ðuðs uÞÞ ¼ j0ðacÞ ¼ min
x0ac
j0ðx0Þ ¼ 0Since jðsuÞ < jðsuÞ, the conditional ðujsÞ corresponding to ðcjaÞ in SenOðR0Þ under u, is accepted by j.3.3. Possibilistic semantics
A possibility distribution is a function p : X! ½0;1 (cf. e.g. [6]). Each possibility distribution induces a possibility measure
on propositional formulas which will also be denoted by p: For each A 2 SenBðRÞ,pðAÞ ¼ max
xA
pðxÞwhere max ; ¼ 0, considering ; as a subset of ½0;1, the range of possibility distributions. Then it holds that
pðA _ BÞ ¼maxfpðAÞ;pðBÞg and pðA ^ BÞ 6 minfpðAÞ;pðBÞg for any two propositional formulas A;B 2 SenBðRÞ. For contradic-
tory A ?, we have pðAÞ ¼ 0.
Here, a conditional ðBjAÞ is accepted by p iff pðABÞ > pðABÞ, i.e. if its veriﬁcation is more possible than its falsiﬁcation.
In order to make the possibilistic semantics more compatible with the other qualitative semantics considered in this pa-
per, we will only consider positive possibility distributions, that is, we will presuppose pðxÞ > 0 for all x 2 X. This ensures
that for all non-contradictory propositions A, we have pðAÞ > 0. We start with specifying the language of the institution
InstPþ .
Signatures and Sentences: As for ordinal conditionals, we have SigPþ ¼ SigB and SenPþ ¼ SenK.
Models: The models of this institution are positive possibility distributions, i.e.jModPþ ðRÞj ¼ fp : XR ! ½0;1jpðxÞ > 0 for all xg
For each signature morphismu : R! R0, we deﬁne a functorModPþ ðuÞ : ModPþ ðR0Þ ! ModPþ ðRÞ by mapping a positive pos-
sibility distribution p0 over ModPþ ðR0Þ to a positive possibility distribution ModPþ ðuÞðp0Þ over ModPþ ðRÞ in the following
way:ModPþ ðuÞðp0ÞðxÞ ¼ p0ðuðxÞÞ ð6Þ
It is obvious that ModPðuÞðp0Þ is a possibility distribution, and due to the prerequisite of signature morphisms being injec-
tive, it is also positive.
For a propositional formula A 2 SenBðRÞ, we have ModPþ ðuÞðp0ÞðAÞ ¼ p0ðuðAÞÞ.
Satisfaction relation: The satisfaction relation Pþ ;R # jModPþ ðRÞj  SenPþ ðRÞ is deﬁned, for any R 2 jSigPþ j, by
pPþ ;R ðBjAÞ iff pðABÞ > pðABÞ
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than its refutation AB.
Proposition 10. InstPþ ¼ hSigPþ ; ModPþ ; SenPþ ; Pþ i is an institution.
Proof. We still have to check the satisfaction condition which follows by:p0 Pþ ;R0 SenPþ ðuÞððBjAÞÞ iff p0 Pþ ;R0 ðuðBÞjuðAÞÞ
iff p0ðuðABÞÞ > p0ðuðABÞÞ
iff ModPþ ðuÞðp0ÞðABÞ > ModPþ ðuÞðp0ÞðABÞ
iff ModPþ ðuÞðp0Þ Pþ ;R ðBjAÞ Example 11. In a possibilistic framework, our running Example 7 can be modelled as follows:p0ðabcÞ ¼ 1
p0ðabcÞ ¼ p0ðabcÞ ¼ 0:7
p0ðabcÞ ¼ p0ðabcÞ ¼ p0ðabcÞ ¼ p0ðabcÞ ¼ p0ðabcÞ ¼ 0:3Again, it should be clear that p0 is not uniquely determined by R0.
The conditional ðcjaÞ is accepted by p0, as p0ðacÞ ¼maxfp0ðabcÞ;p0ðabcÞg ¼ 0:7 and p0ðacÞ ¼maxfp0ðabcÞ;p0ðabcÞg ¼ 0:3;
so p0ðacÞ > p0ðacÞ, and therefore p0 Pþ ;R0 ðcjaÞ.
ModPþ ðuÞ maps p0 onto p :¼ ModPþ ðuÞðp0Þ, which, according to (6), is determined by:pðsuÞ ¼ p0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ p0ðacÞ ¼max
x0ac
p0ðx0Þ ¼ 0:7
pðsuÞ ¼ p0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ p0ðacÞ ¼max
x0ac
p0ðx0Þ ¼ 0:3
pðsuÞ ¼ p0ðuðsuÞÞ ¼ p0ðacÞ ¼max
x0ac
p0ðx0Þ ¼ 0:7
pðs uÞ ¼ p0ðuðs uÞÞ ¼ p0ðacÞ ¼ max
x0a c
p0ðx0Þ ¼ 1:0Since pðsuÞ > pðsuÞ, the conditional ðujsÞ corresponding to ðcjaÞ in SenOðR0Þ under u, is accepted by p.3.4. Qualitative probabilities
Finally, we will describe a way of representing conditionals by probabilities in a qualitative way.
Ernest Adams was the ﬁrst to present a probabilistic framework for qualitative default reasoning. In his work [1], he used
an inﬁnitesimal approach to deﬁne ‘‘reasonable (probabilistic) consequences”. On these ideas, Pearl later based his -seman-
tics [16] which turned out to be the same as preferential semantics and can be characterized by the following axioms for non-
monotonic inference relations j which have become known as system P [12]:Reflexiv ity or Inclusion : A j A
Cut :
A ^ B j C; A j B
A j C
Cautious Monotony :
A j B; A j C
A ^ B j C
Right Weakening :
A j B; B  C
A j C
Left Logical Equivalence :  A  B; A j C
B j C
Or :
A j C; B j C
A _ B j CTherefore, the inﬁnitesimal -semantics provides a probabilistic semantics for system P.
This seemed hardly possible to realize within a standard probabilistic framework. An obvious way to interpret a default
rule ‘‘usually, if A then B”, or ‘‘from A, defeasibly infer B” (written as A jB) by a probability distribution P would be to pos-
tulate PðABÞ > PðABÞ (which is equivalent to PðBjAÞ > 0:5). I.e. given A, the presence of B should be more probable than its
absence. This interpretation, however, is not generally compatible with system P, it may conﬂict, for instance, with the
OR-postulate of system P. Indeed, it is easy to ﬁnd counterexamples where PðACÞ > PðACÞ and PðBCÞ > PðBCÞ, but
PððA _ BÞCÞ < PððA _ BÞCÞ. So, in order to give reasonable probabilistic meanings to defaults, one has to focus on special sub-
classes of probability distributions.
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known as big-stepped probabilities (this more intuitive name was coined by Benferhat et al. see [5]).
Deﬁnition 12. A big-stepped probability distribution P over a signature R is a probability distribution on XR such that the
following conditions are satisﬁed for all x;x0;x1;x2 2 XR:PðxÞ > 0 ð7Þ
Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ iff x1 ¼ x2 ð8Þ
Pðx0Þ >
X
x:Pðx0Þ>PðxÞ
PðxÞ ð9ÞThe set of all big-stepped probability distributions over R is denoted by PBSðRÞ.
Each big-stepped probability distribution P : XR ! ½0;1 uniquely extends to general propositional formulas A 2 SenBðRÞ
by settingPðAÞ ¼
X
x2XR ;xB;RA
PðxÞ:Big-stepped probabilities are quite artiﬁcial constructions which are rarely to never found in applications. They are built in
such a way as to allow qualitative reasoning with probabilities. The requirements (8) and (9) are particularly crucial for this
aim. (8) undercuts the number argument of probabilistic reasoning that takes into account how many models of the same
probability are considered. Condition (9) inhibits that many small probabilities might have more impact than a big proba-
bility; it explains the attribute ‘‘big-stepped”: In a big-stepped probability distribution, the probability of each possible world
is bigger than the sum of all probabilities of less probable worlds. The relevance of these properties will become clear from
the propositions and proofs given in this section. Big-stepped probabilities actually provide a standard probabilistic seman-
tics for system P, as was shown in [5].
The following two lemmata give a more detailed impression of properties of big-stepped probabilities, and of their resem-
blance to ordinal presentations of belief.
Lemma 13. Let P 2 PBSðRÞ be a big-stepped probability distribution over a signature R, and let A;B be two propositional formulas.
Then PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ iff A  B.
Proof. For any propositional formula A, let XA ¼ fx 2 XjxB;R Ag and let maxworldPðAÞ denote the world x 2 XA such that
PðxÞ is maximal; note that maxworldPðAÞ is unique due to (8).
If A  B, then XA ¼ XB and therefore PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ.
Now let PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ. If PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ ¼ 0, then XA ¼ XB ¼ ; and both A and B are equivalent to ?. If PðAÞ > 0, then both
xA ¼ maxworldPðAÞ and xB ¼ maxworldPðBÞ exist. Furthermore, xA ¼ xB must hold: If xA–xB, w.l.o.g. we can assume
PðxAÞ > PðxBÞ using (8). With the help of (9) we getPðAÞP PðxAÞ >
X
x:PðxAÞ>PðxÞ
PðxÞ P
X
x:PðxBÞPPðxÞ
PðxÞP PðBÞ ð10Þin contradiction to PðAÞ ¼ PðBÞ. Hence, xA ¼ xB, and by induction on the cardinality of XA it follows that XA ¼ XB and there-
fore A  B. h
Lemma 14. Let P 2 PBSðRÞ be a big-stepped probability distribution over a signature R, and let A;B be two non-contradictory,
exclusive propositional formulas. ThenPðAÞ > PðBÞ iff 9x0  A;8x  B : Pðx0Þ > PðxÞ ð11ÞProof. If PðAÞ > PðBÞ choosex0 ¼ maxworldPðAÞ (using the notation from Lemma 13). Because A and B are exclusive,x0 R XB.
Now assume there were x1 2 XB such that Pðx1ÞP Pðx0Þ. Since x1–x0 we have Pðx1Þ > Pðx0ÞP PðxÞ for all x 2 XA.
Therefore,PðBÞP Pðx1Þ >
X
xA
PðxÞ ¼ PðAÞcontradicting PðAÞ > PðBÞ.
To show the other direction, assume now there is x0  A such that Pðx0Þ > PðxÞ for all x with x  B. Then both
xA ¼ maxworldPðAÞ andxB ¼ maxworldPðBÞ exist since A and B are both non-contradictory. W.l.o.g. we can assumex0 ¼ xA.
Obviously, PðxAÞ > PðxBÞ and as in (10) we can derive PðAÞ > PðBÞ as required. h
These lemmata will prove useful in the sequel. We are now ready to set up the institution InstS of big-stepped
probabilities.
Signatures and sentences: Once again, we set SigS ¼ SigB and SenS ¼ SenK.
Models: ModSðRÞ is the full subcategory obtained from the category of probability distributions by restriction to the big-
stepped probability distributions PBSðRÞ:
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For each signature morphism u : R! R0, we deﬁne a functorModSðuÞ : ModSðR0Þ ! ModSðRÞ by mapping each big-stepped
distribution P0 over R0 to a distributionModSðuÞðP0Þ over R which is deﬁned by giving its value for all complete conjunctions
x over R:ðModSðuÞðP0ÞÞðxÞ :¼ P0ðuðxÞÞLemma 15. ModSðuÞ is well-deﬁned, i.e. ModSðuÞðP0Þ is again a big-stepped probability.
Proof. For P :¼ ModSðuÞðP0Þ we have to show (7)–(9). For any world x, PðxÞ ¼ P0ðuðxÞÞ > 0 since the injectivity of u
ensures that uðxÞX ?, hence (7) holds. Let x1, x2 be worlds with Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ. From the deﬁnition of P, we get
Pðx1Þ ¼ ðModSðuÞðP0ÞÞðx1Þ ¼ P0ðuðx1ÞÞ and Pðx2Þ ¼ ðModSðuÞðP0ÞÞðx2Þ ¼ P0ðuðx2ÞÞ. Hence P0ðuðx1ÞÞ ¼ P0ðuðx2ÞÞ and
therefore uðx1Þ  uðx2Þ by Lemma 13. Since x1 and x2 are complete conjunctions. the injectivity of u implies x1 ¼ x2,
ensuring (8).
To prove (9), let x0 2 XR, and consider x1 2 XR with Pðx0Þ > Pðx1Þ. Then trivially, x0–x1, so uðx0Þ and uðx1Þ are
exclusive and non-contradictory. From P0ðuðx0ÞÞ > P0ðuðx1ÞÞ and Lemma 14, it follows that there isx00B;Ruðx0Þ such that
P0ðx00Þ > P0ðx0Þ for allx0 B;Ruðx1Þ. Obviously, we can choosex00 ¼ maxworldP0 ðuðx0ÞÞ, using the notation from the proof of
Lemma 13. This holds for all such x1, henceP0ðx00Þ >
X
x1 :Pðx0Þ>Pðx1Þ
X
x0B;Ruðx1Þ
P0ðx0Þ ¼
X
x1 :Pðx0Þ>Pðx1Þ
P0ðuðx1ÞÞsince P0 is a big-stepped probability. From x00B;Ruðx0Þ we get P0ðuðx0ÞÞP P0ðx00Þ, and therefore
Pðx0Þ ¼ P0ðuðx0ÞÞ P P0ðx00Þ >
X
x1 :Pðx0Þ>Pðx1Þ
Pðx1Þwhich was to be shown. h
Satisfaction relation: The satisfaction relation S;R between jModSðRÞj and SenSðRÞ is deﬁned, for any R 2 jSigPj, by:
PS;R ðBjAÞ iff PðABÞ > PðABÞProposition 16. InstS ¼ hSigS; ModS; SenS; S i is an institution.
Proof. What remains to be shown is that the satisfaction condition from Deﬁnition 1 is satisﬁed, requiringP0 S;R0 SenSðuÞðBjAÞ iff ModSðuÞðP0ÞS;R ðBjAÞ
to hold. This is the case since SenSðuÞðBjAÞ ¼ ðuðBÞjuðAÞÞ and ModSðuÞðP0ÞðBjAÞ ¼ P0ðuðBÞjuðAÞÞ. h
Example 17. When specifying our Example 7 by big-stepped probabilities, we have to observe carefully the crucial property
(9). In principle, it is straightforward to obtain a big-stepped probability from a given preorder; more details can be found
e.g. in [5]. Here, we model our example in the following way:x0 P0ðx0Þ x0 P0ðx0Þ
abc 0.501 abc 0.004
abc 0.063 abc 0.008
abc 0.032 abc 0.016
abc 0.126 abc 0.250From this, one computes easily P0ðacÞ ¼ 0:250þ 0:008 ¼ 0:258 and P0ðacÞ ¼ 0:016þ 0:004 ¼ 0:020; hence the conditional
ðcjaÞ is accepted by P0.
The induced distribution P :¼ ModSðuÞðP0Þ has the following values:x PðxÞ
s u Pðs uÞ = P0ðacÞ = 0.533
su PðsuÞ = P0ðacÞ = 0.189
su PðsuÞ = P0ðacÞ = 0.020
su P(su) = P0ðacÞ = 0.258Since PðsuÞ > PðsuÞ, P accepts the conditional ðujsÞ corresponding to ðcjaÞ in SenSðR0Þ under u.
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Now that we have formalized all semantics for conditionals under investigation in this paper as institutions, we can use
institution morphisms (cf. Section 2.3) to study formal logical relationships between them. Since InstK, InstO, InstPþ , and
InstS all have the same category SigB of signatures, a natural choice for the signature translation component / in any mor-
phism between these institutions is the identity idSigB which we will use in the following. Moreover, since all sentence func-
tors are also identical to SenK (i.e. SenK ¼ SenO ¼ SenPþ ¼ SenS), any morphism between these institutions should use the
identical natural transformationidSenK : SenK ) SenK idSenK ;RððBjAÞÞ ¼ ðBjAÞIn the following subsections, we will ﬁrst relate InstK to each of InstPþ , InstO and InstS; all other relations between these
institutions will then be obtained directly by combining the results shown.
4.1. Relating InstK and InstPþ
In this subsection, we will investigate whether the introduction of numbers in possibility theory makes a substantial dif-
ference to interpreting conditionals in a purely qualitative way, as is done in InstK.
Having ﬁxed the signature and sentence translations to be the identity, we are left with the problem of specifying natural
transformations b1 : ModK ) ModPþ and b2 : ModPþ ) ModK, respectively, between the models.
The models of InstK are total preorders on the set of possible worlds XR and hence correspond to comparative possibility
distributions (see [5]). Obviously, each (positive) possibility distribution p on XR can be mapped onto a total preorderRp 2 ModKðRÞ; x1Rpx2 iff pðx1ÞP pðx2Þ: ð12ÞConversely, if R is a total preorder in ModKðRÞ deﬁning a partitioning X0;X1; . . . ;Xn on XR with MinðRÞ ¼ X0, we choose a
sequence a0 ¼ 1 > a1 >    > an > 0 of real numbers and deﬁne a positive possibility distribution pR 2 ModPþ ðRÞ by setting
pRðxÞ ¼ ai iff x 2 Xi. Hence, plausibility is identiﬁed with possibility.
Each possibility distribution determines a total preorder in a unique way, but note that a whole bunch of possibility dis-
tributions can be associated with the same total preorder R. However, for each such pR with chosen numbers
a0 ¼ 1 > a1 >    > an > 0, the connection between R and pR is given byx1Rx2 iff pRðx1ÞP pRðx2Þ ð13Þwhich is easy to verify: x1Rx2 iff x1 2 Xi;x2 2 Xj; i 6 j iff pRðx1Þ ¼ ai P aj ¼ pRðx2Þ. Using these correspondencies, we
can easily move from purely qualitative to possibilistic conditional semantics and back.
Proposition 18. Let the natural transformations bK=Pþ and bPþ=K be deﬁned as follows:bK=Pþ : ModK ) ModPþ bK=Pþ ;RðRÞ ¼ pR
bPþ=K : ModPþ ) ModK bPþ=K ;RðpÞ ¼ RpThen both h idSigB ; idSenK ; bK=Pþ i : InstK ! InstPþ and h idSigB ; idSenK ; bPþ=K i : InstPþ ! InstK are institution morphisms. More-
over, h idSigB ; idSenK ; b i is an institution morphism iff b ¼ bPþ=K.
Proof. First, we check the case h idSigB ; idSenK ; bK=Pþ i : InstK ! InstPþ . Let R 2 ModKðRÞ; bK=Pþ ;RðRÞ ¼ pR. The satisfaction
condition for morphisms then reads RK;R ðBjAÞ iff pRPþ ;R ðBjAÞ, i.e. ABRAB iff pRðABÞ > pRðABÞ. Since pR is positive, this
is equivalent to postulating x1Rx2 iff pRðx1ÞP pRðx2Þ, which is precisely (13).
For h idSigB ; idSenK ; bPþ=K i : InstPþ ! InstK, the satisfaction condition is pPþ ;R ðBjAÞ iff bPþ=K ;RðpÞ  ðBjAÞ,
i.e. pðABÞ > pðABÞ iff ABRpAB. Again, since p is positive, this is equivalent to (12). h4.2. Relating InstK and InstO
Since we have already ﬁxed signature and sentence translations, we focus our investigations on relating the models of
these institutions. Going from InstO to InstK, we have to transform ordinal conditional functions into total preorders so that
the satisfaction condition for morphismsjO;R ðBjAÞ iff bO=K ;RðjÞK;R ðBjAÞholds with a natural transformation bO=K : ModO ) ModK where bO=K ;RðjÞ ¼ Rj for an OCF j. A natural choice to deﬁne Rj isx1Rjx2 iff jðx1Þ 6 jðx2Þ ð14Þ
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minimal worlds. The deﬁnition of OCFs ensures that jðxÞ–1 for all worlds x. Therefore, (14) is equivalent to ABRjAB iff
jðABÞ < jðABÞ, which is the required satisfaction condition. This equivalence implies that Rj is uniquely determined. Thus,
we have proved the following.
Proposition 19. Let bO=K be as deﬁned in (14). Then bO=K is the only natural transformation such that
h idSigB ; idSenK ; bO=K i : InstO ! InstK is an institution morphism.
In the other direction, i.e. from InstK to InstO, we have to associate ordinal conditional functions to total preorders. Each
such preorder R induces a partitioning X0;X1; . . . of X, and we deﬁne jR byjRðxÞ ¼ i iff x 2 Xi
jR is an ordinal conditional function, satisfyingx1Rx2 iff jRðx1Þ 6 jRðx2Þ ð15Þ
It is obvious that any other OCF j respecting (15) will do as well.
Proposition 20. Let bK=O be deﬁned as follows:bK=O : ModK ) ModO; bK=O ;RðRÞ ¼ jR
Then h idSigB ; idSenK ; bK=O i : InstK ! InstO is an institution morphism.
Proof. The satisfaction condition we have to check reads RK;R ðBjAÞ iff jRO;R ðBjAÞ which again comes down to showing
x1Rx2 iff jRðx1Þ 6 jRðx2Þ, i.e. (15). h
Note that in this case, bK=O is not uniquely determined by the satisfaction condition, hence the institution morphism is
not unique.
4.3. Relating InstK and InstS
After having established successfully and quite easily formal relationships between InstK and InstO, and InstK and InstPþ ,
respectively, we might expect that similarly straightforward techniques will work here, too. And indeed, similar to [5], an
obvious way to deﬁne a natural transformation b : ModS ) ModK is to associate to each big-stepped probability
PBS 2 ModSðRÞ a total preorder RPBS 2 ModKðRÞ viax1RPBSx2 iff PBSðx1ÞP PBSðx2Þ ð16ÞThe next proposition shows this to be (uniquely) successful.
Proposition 21. h idSigB ; idSenK ; b i : InstS ! InstK is an institution morphism iff b ¼ bS=K with bS=K ;RðPBSÞ :¼ RPBS as deﬁned in
(16) for each R 2 SigB and PBS 2 ModSðRÞ.
It is straightforward to check that h idSigB ; idSenK ; bS=K i is indeed an institution morphism, and that the satisfaction con-
dition leaves no other possibility.
So, also on formal logical grounds, the big-stepped probability distributions prove to be adequate to implement qualita-
tive conditional reasoning. The institution morphism from InstS to InstK makes probabilistic reasoning with big-stepped
probabilities fully compatible to qualitative reasoning based on total preorders.
However, in the other direction, going from InstK to InstS, more difﬁculties are encountered. Here, we have a ﬁrst neg-
ative result which is stated in the following proposition, pointing to an incompatibility between conditional semantics:
Proposition 22. There is no institution morphism h idSigB ; idSenK ; b i : InstK ! InstS.
Proof. Assume there were such an institution morphism h idSigB ; idSenK ; b i : InstK ! InstS. Then for each R 2 ModKðRÞ,
PR :¼ bRðRÞ 2 ModSðRÞ is a big-stepped probability distribution. The satisfaction condition (for morphisms) requires
RK;R ðBjAÞ iff PRS;R ðBjAÞ, i.e. ABRAB iff PRðABÞ > PRðABÞ, which implies x1Rx2 iff PRðx1Þ > PRðx2Þ for x1;x2 2 XR.
Now, we could choose R such that x1	Rx2 and x1–x2, yielding Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ, which is impossible in InstS. h
Thus, there is no way of mapping ordinal models from InstK to big-stepped probabilistic models in InstS within such an
institution morphism – the strict linear order of a big-stepped probability is substantially more ﬁnely grained than a
preorder.
One might wonder if this property of reﬂecting a strict linear order can not be weakened for qualitative probabilities. In
[2], we investigated which subclasses of probability distributions are adequate for qualitative reasoning, and we found that
big-stepped probabilities are essentially the only ones. In particular, the property of being a strict linear order can be weak-
ened only very slightly:
Fig. 2. Institution morphisms between InstK , InstO , InstPþ , and InstS .
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PðABÞ > PðABÞ iff ABRAB ð17Þfor all propositional sentences A;B. Then P must be injective on worlds, except on at most two minimal worlds, i.e. P has to satisfy
the following condition for all x1;x2 2 X:Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ iff
x1 ¼ x2; or for all x 2 XR n fx1;x2g; PðxÞ > Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ
ð18ÞProof. Since P is positive, condition (17) implies for all worlds x1;x2x1Rx2 iff Pðx1ÞP Pðx2Þ: ð19Þ
We will ﬁrst show that at most two different worlds may have the same probability value under P. Assume there were pair-
wise different worlds x1;x2;x3 with Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ ¼ Pðx3Þ, hence x1	Rx2	Rx3 due to (19). Consider ðBjAÞ with
A ¼ x1 _x2 _x3 and B ¼ x1 _x2. Then AB ¼ x1 _x2, AB ¼ x3, with PðABÞ ¼ Pðx1Þ þ Pðx2Þ, PðABÞ ¼ Pðx3Þ, and therefore
PðABÞ > PðABÞ. On the other hand, x1 _x2	Rx3 and thus AB	RAB, contradicting (17).
So, assume now that x1–x2 are two different possible worlds with the same probability value, Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ. If this
were not the minimal probability value assigned by P, there would be another x3 such that 0 < Pðx3Þ < Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ. By
virtue of (19), x1	Rx2Rx3. In this case, we consider the conditional ðBjAÞ with A ¼ x1 _x2 _x3 and B ¼ x1 _x3. Then
AB ¼ x1 _x3, AB ¼ x2. Due to the positiveness of P, PðABÞ ¼ Pðx1Þ þ Pðx3Þ > Pðx1Þ ¼ Pðx2Þ ¼ PðABÞ. But AB ¼ x1_
x3	Rx1	Rx2 ¼ AB, again a contradiction to (17). h
That is, a necessary condition for a probability distribution to be appropriate for qualitative reasoning is to assign different
probability values to different worlds, with the only exception of assigning the minimal value to at most two different
worlds.
4.4. A general picture of qualitative conditional semantics
Putting together the results of the preceding subsections, we obtain a general picture of relationships between the differ-
ent institutions InstK, InstO, InstPþ , and InstS.
We have morphisms between InstK and InstO, on the one hand side, and InstK and InstPþ , on the other. Composing these,
we also obtain morphisms from InstO to InstPþ and back. All morphisms to InstK are unique, but for the other directions,
there is more than one possibility to specify morphisms. This corresponds to the greater semantical richness of InstO and
InstPþ that allows for the expression of ranks of plausibility, or possibility, respectively.
There are also morphisms going from InstS to InstK and hence, by composition, to InstO and InstPþ as well. However, by
using composition arguments or a similar argumentation as for Proposition 22, neither of InstK, InstO, and InstPþ can be
mapped to InstS by an institution morphism. This is due to the rigid structure of big-stepped probabilities that is necessary
to undercut additive probabilistic arguments. This result shows that even the artiﬁcial construct of big-stepped probabilities
which have been conceived for qualitative reasoning cannot bridge completely the deep gap between probabilistic and plau-
sible reasoning.
Fig. 2 illustrates the existing and non-existing links via morphisms between the institutions of purely qualitative, positive
possibilistic, ordinal, and big-stepped conditionals, respectively.
5. Conclusions and further work
In this paper, we studied various conditional logics within the formal framework of institutions with the intention to
make similarities and differences among them very clear. More precisely, we formalized a purely qualitative, system of
spheres-like logic (InstK), a positive possibilistic (InstPþ ), an ordinal (InstO) and a qualitative probabilistic logic (InstS) as
institutions, providing a common ground for detailed investigations on relationships among them. We used institution mor-
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tutions. All of these conditional logics being qualitative, we expected to ﬁnd basic structural similarities.
And indeed, the possibilistic, the ordinal and the qualitative probabilistic logic all can be mapped uniquely onto the purely
qualitative logic. That is, a possibility distribution, an ordinal conditional function and a big-stepped probability all give rise
to a plausibility preorder in a unique way. This result might not appear very surprising, although establishing it in the very
rigid institutional framework provides a more formal justiﬁcation for it. Yet there is one detail that has not been paid much
attention to in the past, but which is shown to reveal crucial differences between conditional logics: The fact whether pos-
sible worlds may have the same degree of belief as contradictions. To establish this seemingly clear link to purely qualitative
conditional logic sketched above, one has to make sure that degrees of possibility or probability, respectively, are positive,
and that ordinal degrees of (dis)belief are ﬁnite. Otherwise, the tight link between syntax and semantics that is needed for
morphisms is lost, showing clearly the greater expressiveness of semi-quantitative conditional logics which use some kind of
numerical values in a qualitative way, compared to a purely qualitative approach based on relations only. In the latter, all
possible worlds are strictly better than contradictions. On the other hand, the concept of normalization for possibility dis-
tributions (i.e. postulating that pðXÞ ¼ 1) was not necessary to establish the results presented in this paper.
Furthermore, it was easy to ﬁnd morphisms going into the other direction for possibilistic and ordinal institutions by
associating appropriate degrees of possibility, and disbelief, respectively, to a purely qualitative model. However, this can
be done in many different ways, so uniqueness does not hold here. As obvious as this technique may seem, it does not work
for qualitative probabilities: There is no such straightforward connection between a plausibility preorder and a big-stepped
probability that satisﬁes the morphism condition. The additive structure of probabilities proved to make a crucial difference,
even when used in a qualitative way. The institutional framework allows us to work this out very clearly.
In summary, the purely qualitative conditional semantics provided by plausibility preorders turned out to yield the weak-
est conditional logic under investigation, and there is a gap of expressiveness between the conditional semantics based on
big-stepped probabilities and all the other conditional semantics considered in this paper.
Whereas in this paper, we focussed on qualitative conditional semantics, one of the most popular semantics of condition-
als is the one which is based on conditional probabilities. In [2], we showed that in such a quantitative environment, an insti-
tution of probabilistic conditionals InstC can be deﬁned in a similar way, as was done here in a qualitative framework. But
crucial differences become apparent when studying relationships between InstC and InstK via morphisms: A unique institu-
tion morphism going from InstC to InstK can be deﬁned in a canonical way, but in principle, there is no morphism going in
the other direction [2]. As we found morphisms between InstO, InstPþ , and InstK, similar results hold for all three institutions.
This means that the probabilistic semantics for conditionals can be projected onto each qualitative semantics, but there is no
way to recover the richness of conditional probabilities from within a qualitative semantical framework.
As part of our future work, we will use institutions for semantics induced by so-called conditional valuation functions [11],
aiming at completing quite a general formal picture of conditional semantics.
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